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 ABSTRACT 
Objectives: This case study examines the impact of humanitarian aid from the 
perspectives of local stakeholders in Sri Lanka following the tsunami 
disaster of December 2004.  
 
Study Design: Qualitative study using key-informant and focus group interviews. 
 
Methods: Key-informant and focus group interviews were conducted with 
tsunami survivors, community leaders, the local authorities and aid 
workers sampled purposively. Data collected was analysed using 
thematic analysis.  
 
Results: The study found that aid had aggravated social tensions and the lack of 
community engagement led to grievances. There was a perceived lack 
of transparency, beneficiary expectations were not always met and it 
was difficult to match aid to needs. Rapid participatory approaches to 
obtain beneficiary feedback in post disaster settings are possible but 
have limitations due to respondent bias.  
 
Conclusions: In order to mitigate adverse social impacts of their programmes, 
humanitarian aid agencies need to better understand the context in 
which aid is delivered. Beneficiary feedback is essential in disaster 
planning and response so that disaster response can be better matched 
to the needs of beneficiaries. 
 
Keywords:  Disaster; Tsunami; Community; Needs; Emergency; Relief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 26, 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia generated a 
massive tsunami that devastated vast coastal areas across the Indian Ocean. In Sri 
Lanka, the tsunami caused 38,195 fatalities and rendered 834,000 people homeless.1-3  
In one eastern district alone, Ampara suffered more than 10,000 deaths and 193,000 
persons displaced. Survivors faced severe shortages of shelter, sanitation and clean 
water, and there was widespread damage to the local infrastructure and coastal 
transport networks.4 In the aftermath, the Sri Lankan Government, foreign 
governments, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and ordinary 
citizens worldwide mounted a vigorous aid response.5  
 
Although humanitarian assistance is assumed to be beneficial, aid can have 
detrimental effects  and many aid programmes are inadequately evaluated.6-9 
Evaluations conducted frequently have a donor or INGO bias where the achievement 
of targets and objectives take precedence.10,11 These evaluations often lack sufficient 
beneficiary feedback due to operational constraints in emergency settings that favour 
top-down approaches.12,13 As such, there is a need for greater beneficiary 
accountability by INGOs for both quality assurance and ethical reasons.10,14,15 
 
Between 29 May and 9 July 2005, a qualitative survey using participatory approaches 
was carried out to explore the perceptions of local stakeholders, such as villagers, 
community leaders and aid workers, of the impact of humanitarian aid in Ampara 
district, Sri Lanka.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
A Medline search was conducted for articles on the impact of aid, and evaluations of 
aid and disaster response programmes. The specialist journal Disasters was manually 
searched as well as back tracing of reference lists. Grey literature sources, such as 
humanitarian sector websites (ALNAP Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, ODI and 
ReliefWeb), and reports from the Sri Lankan National Disaster Management Centre 
were accessed. Operational information including internal reports and evaluations was 
provided by an INGO operating in Ampara. This gave contextual and programme 
information, which helped formulate interview topics and identify appropriate 
interviewees.  
 
Local stakeholder feedback was collected through key-informant and focus group 
interviews. (Table 1) Sampling of participants was purposive with the intention of 
gathering a representative and broad range of perspectives. Participants included 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of aid, and vulnerable groups such as women, the 
elderly, and an ethnic minority group. Similarly, various key-informants were 
interviewed including aid-workers, local community and religious leaders, and 
representatives from the local authorities and fishing cooperatives. 
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Table 1. Summary of Interviews Conducted 
Unit of study Description Number of interviewees 
Men’s group 1 3 
Men’s group 2 4 
Women’s group 6 
Non-‘Tamil/Muslim’ group 7 
Focus Groups 
Local Mosque Trustee Board  8 
   
INGO Expatriate staff 8 
INGO Local Staff 3 
Other NGOs 3 
Local Government Officials 2 
Key Informants 
Interviews 
Local Fishing Cooperatives 3 
   
Non-beneficiaries 7 
Beneficiaries 5 
Opportunistic 
Unstructured 
Interviews 
 
Other NGO 1 
 Total number of people interviewed 60 
 
 
Semi-structured questionnaires and interview topic guides were devised for the key-
informant and group interviews respectively. Interviews covered what aid was 
distributed, how aid was distributed, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ effects of aid, 
sustainability, beneficiary involvement and satisfaction with aid. Group interviews 
were held in communal areas deemed as ‘neutral territory’ by participants such as 
mosque halls. Interviews were recorded with the participants’ consent for later 
translation and transcription, and subsequently analysed using thematic analysis. 
Themes from the interviews were identified and related back to similar themes in the 
published literature. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The effect of aid on pre-existing social divisions  
Ampara’s population consists of Tamil Muslims and Sinhalese, and minority 
communities such as non-Muslim Tamils, and Malays. The various ethnic groups tend 
to cluster in separate communities along the coast. Agriculture and fishing were the 
main industries, but unemployment levels were high and 65% of the population lived 
below the poverty line. The district is claimed by the separatist Tamil Tiger 
movement and has endured two decades of conflict. Consequently, the communities 
are polarized with resources distributed along blood-ties, ethnic and caste differences 
with pre-existing tensions and suspicion.16 
 
One recurrent theme was the impact of aid on these social tensions. As one 
community leader described, “there are two communities, Tamil and Muslim, and it 
might be dangerous for our lives to speak openly”. Tensions were worsened by local 
practices of retribution and “people making [false] accusations”. Post-tsunami, aid 
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appears to have aggravated tensions and created new divisions. For example, the 
community was arbitrarily divided into ‘tsunami-affected’ persons eligible for 
humanitarian aid, and ‘non-tsunami-affected’, who were ineligible. These distinctions 
seemed alien and inequitable to the community. Some humanitarian aid such as 
material aid to the fishing cooperatives, also inadvertently reinforced this inequity as 
it favoured young able-bodied men. This led to calls from community leaders for aid 
to be ‘community-based’ rather than allocated on an individual basis.  
 
Box 1. Quotes from interviews – Aid exacerbating divisions 
 
“Many beneficiaries received help but there are many poor people who have not 
received aid. Aid should be extended to help the non-tsunami people.” 
 Local village headman 
 
“The people who were affected were not given [aid], but the people who were not 
affected were given. So there is a problem.” 
Local community leader 
 
“All are affected by the tsunami. The people say, ‘We didn’t get [aid], but [other 
people] were given!’ In that way, [the people] are disappointed.” 
Middle-aged Tamil man 
 
 
Despite attempts to ensure fair distribution of aid by INGOs, this was difficult to 
achieve and may have worsened local income inequalities. For example, many INGO 
transactions were with local businesses minimally affected by the disaster whilst 
many in the community remained unemployed. Aid recipients also ended up 
materially better off than non-recipients. The availability of substantial amounts of aid 
also spawned ‘disaster entrepreneurs’ who opportunistically attempted to manipulate 
the aid distribution system to obtain aid. As aid-workers observed, locals would 
conspire: “Today you will come representing me, tomorrow I will come representing 
you”. In some instances village leaders would inflate the number of survivors to boost 
aid allocation in their areas. Those who had control of access to resources stood to 
gain both financially and politically.11 
 
Over time, resource competition for aid led to grievances increasingly directed at the 
INGOs. Aid workers were frequently harassed “to adjust” the entitlement criteria for 
aid, and occasionally even assaulted. Local tensions were thus heightened by both real 
and perceived inequities in the distribution of aid.   
 
Issues with community engagement 
Both INGO and community interviewees reported issues with community 
engagement. Initially, the arrival of INGOs was viewed positively and community 
relations had a marked ‘courtesy bias’. Beneficiary feedback was uncritical.  Latterly, 
grievances surfaced following perceived irregularities in aid allocation. The 
community had no means of voicing their grievances due to language barriers and the 
lack of direct access to the INGOs. Unresolved grievances in turn soured relations and 
created problems for the local authorities and community leaders. One community 
leader complained, “The public was annoyed. They wanted to fight and argue and 
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make problems. I had to speak to them to try and solve this problem in a peaceful 
manner.”  
 
After the disaster, many survivors were destitute and felt powerless and vulnerable 
(Box 2). The lack of community engagement in the implementation of aid 
programmes exacerbated such feelings. For example, a few respondents felt they 
could not leave their shelters for fear that vacant shelters would be dismantled and 
removed. This hampered them seeking employment or carrying out daily tasks such as 
bathing or fetching water.  
 
 
Local authority engagement was also poor initially partly because many local 
authorities were not in a position to control the delivery of aid. Consequently, many 
NGOs operated freely and unchecked. This later created friction between agencies 
and local authorities who bemoaned their lack of input or control over relief activities. 
Between agencies, local coordination was also suboptimal as the different agencies 
had diverse intentions and capabilities, and there was inter-agency competition for 
work and therefore donor-funding. Coordination difficulties led to duplication of aid 
in certain areas and gaps in others. It also left the community confused as to who was 
providing what aid to whom and where. 
 
Although community engagement was patchy initially, some INGOs did attempt to 
involve stakeholders much more actively. Efforts were made to be more responsive to 
local needs, to engage the community, address grievances and to coordinate with the 
local authorities and other NGOs.17 Despite these efforts, the communities still did not 
feel involved and there were continued criticisms over the lack of engagement. 
Unrealistic expectations of INGOs by beneficiaries did not help either. For example, 
in addition to emergency relief, some expected INGOs to recompense them for 
material losses. 
 
Box 2. Quotes from interviews – Powerlessness and loss of control 
 
“People are in a ‘panic’ situation. They are worried [that they won’t get aid]” 
Local government official 
 
“We thought we could sell the land and move to another place and start a business 
there.  But nobody will buy [the land] because of the tsunami. If we have money we 
can do something. We can open a shop and we can set up a poultry farm. But in this 
situation, we can’t do anything.” 
 
“We can’t cope with this situation. What [the INGOs] have done is very needed. If 
they stop, there will be no more help in the future.” 
 
“We had to accept what was given by them. We have no choice.” 
 
“We are uneducated people. We just do what they say.” 
Quotes from a few Tamil Muslim men 
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More significantly, communication difficulties between INGOs and the community 
contributed to a perceived lack of transparency. Many beneficiaries felt inadequately 
aware of their entitlements or the procedures for obtaining aid. Formal written criteria 
were often unavailable and unsuccessful applicants reported that they were not told 
the reasons why they had failed to secure aid. This led to misunderstandings and 
discontent, fuelling rumours and allegations that were often not helped by inaccurate 
local media reporting of INGO programme activities.  
 
Unmet needs and unfulfilled expectations  
Another commonly raised theme was that of unmet needs and expectations. The initial 
aid provided aimed to address the immediate needs of the beneficiaries, notably for 
shelter, clean water and sanitation. Whilst the INGOs sought to provide for what were 
deemed as essential needs in an equitable manner, this did not always match the 
community’s perception of what they needed. For example, the provision of sanitation 
and health promotion was considered essential by the INGOs. However, pre-tsunami 
only half of the households had latrines, and local hygiene practices tended to be 
good. These relief activities were therefore not felt to be a priority by the local 
community.  
 
Some needs of vulnerable groups, such as widows and women-headed households, 
were also overlooked.  In a male-dominated society where jobs were scarce, it was 
difficult for women to earn a living. The study also uncovered significant unmet 
psycho-social needs of survivors, many of whom suffer post-traumatic stress-related 
symptoms such as anxiety attacks, flashbacks and somatic symptoms (Box 3). Whilst 
most survivors have attempted to resume some semblance of normal routines, others 
have not been able to do so. These unmet needs adversely affected beneficiary 
satisfaction with the relief process.  
 
Box 3. Quotes from interviews – Survivors distress post-disaster 
 
“This area is vulnerable for any attack (tsunami). There is no way to escape. The past 
unpleasant experience often comes to my mind. I can’t live here. We spend the day 
here. When night falls, we spend the night somewhere else to sleep’. 
A local fisherman who survived the tsunami 
 
“We get the fear very often. Sometimes when we get the fear, we leave our things and 
run. When the wind is strong, we fear it is the tsunami. One day it rained heavily. We 
got the fear and we ran away…” 
 
“The ladies get together and console each other. We talk to each other. We pray five 
times and ask our God to give us relief and save the people.” 
 
“The children ask, ‘Will the sea invade again?’ The children tell us, ‘You should not 
go anywhere, the sea will come again!’” 
Quotes from Tamil Muslim women 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The impact of aid in context 
Humanitarian programmes are not implemented in isolation but exist in a social arena 
where context, policy and actors are all interconnected.15,20 In Ampara, aid was not a 
prominent issue of pre-tsunami times but it gained significance in the aftermath. The 
presence and activities of NGOs in the area was highly visible, and the lives of many 
beneficiaries were intricately tied in with the process of obtaining aid. This affected 
pre-existing tensions and brought to surface regressive coping mechanisms in the 
local communities. Top-down delivery mechanisms reinforce dependence on aid and 
do little to encourage self-sufficiency. 
 
The perceptions of aid also vary between the different actors and are influenced by the 
complexities of the circumstances in which aid is delivered.10 For example, the 
reliance on INGO delivery of aid post-tsunami, though welcome initially, could be in 
time seen as a negative phenomenon by the local authorities as it undermines the 
public’s confidence in the government.21 Similarly, from the community’s 
perspective, aid is not always appreciated as it may not meet perceived needs.  
 
An understanding of the local context into which aid is delivered may have mitigated 
these adverse social impacts. This growing awareness that aid can have unintended 
adverse consequences has led to calls for greater accountability by humanitarian 
agencies. 10,14,18,19  However, this pursuit of ‘accountability’ is not straightforward. 
Traditionally, accountability has been internal or to their donors, and beneficiaries 
have lacked effective means to bring INGOs to account.10 
 
Community engagement in disaster settings 
In recent years, community engagement in disaster settings has gained increasing 
credence. Community participation can reveal problems with programmes, imbue 
sustainability and help ensure that aid fits in with local coping strategies.10 It is also a 
means whereby agencies can demonstrate their respect for the beneficiaries.15 
Programmes that do not involve beneficiaries meaningfully may discourage active 
and sustainable participation later on.22  However, as in Ampara, community 
participation is difficult to implement and maintain especially in post-disaster areas 
where numerous operational and political constraints exist. 
 
There are also issues on how the community should be engaged and to what extent 
they are involved. INGOs and the community will have differing views as to what 
constitutes ‘participation’. In emergency settings, beneficiary participation tends to be 
limited to consultation on needs only and on terms dictated by the INGOs. 22, 23 
Unsurprisingly, beneficiaries often feel disengaged despite efforts by agencies to 
accommodate them in programme planning and implementation.22  
 
Another consideration is the choice of participants. INGOs usually consult and rely on 
local authorities and community leaders who in some cases lack the support of the 
populace they serve.24 Subsequent consultations with beneficiaries may lack visibility 
or have been conducted with individuals unrepresentative of the community. It is also 
important to consider how culturally appropriate participation is. A recent study found 
that “ideas about participation are perceived by many in Sri Lanka as counter-cultural 
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with very few civilians being accustomed to exercising choice, or involvement in 
decision-making.”22  
 
In the post-tsunami ‘emergency phase’, ‘top-down’ approaches to aid delivery could 
be justified as “the emotional and psychological consequences are profound and 
households forced to secure their livelihood in the context of severely depleted 
resources and labour-power are unlikely to have much time for meetings, workshops 
and other project activities”.22 However, local community and civic structures in 
Ampara were mostly intact and could have been involved early on. Early involvement 
would have enabled programmes to be more sensitive to the needs of the 
community.12,21 As the situation rapidly evolved from the ‘emergency phase’ to the 
‘post-emergency phase’, the use of ‘bottom-up’ developmental approaches was more 
appropriate.13 Managing this transition is not simple and does require a significant 
change in how programmes are planned and implemented.  
 
Good working relationships between the various actors are an essential ingredient for 
effective programmes. However, relationships can be adversarial in nature and 
compromised by inter-agency competition.24,25  Neither is the relationship between 
NGOs and the communities always easy. Community engagement can involve a tug-
of-war over the control of aid. The handling of grievances is also often problematic. 
Failure to resolve grievances damage community relations, builds up tensions and 
creates future problems for the INGO. Effective mechanisms for addressing 
grievances and settling disputes need to be devised and implemented.  
 
Matching aid to needs  
Matching aid to need is complex (Figure 1) and there is an “inherent tension between 
prescriptive policies and mandates and the expectations of affected populations that 
agencies will respond to their perceived needs”.22,26 The donor or NGO perception of 
needs may be at odds with what the beneficiaries themselves demand or require. 
Consequently, aid delivered may not meet the real needs of survivors. Providing aid 
that is unnecessary is inefficient, whilst ignoring beneficiary demands may fail to 
meet real needs. This raises further dilemmas: What constitutes real needs?  Whose 
needs take precedence? And how can multiple needs be prioritized and catered for?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEED 
SUPPLY DEMAND 
Figure 1. Relation between survival needs of survivors, expressed needs (demand) 
and aid provided (supply) by INGOs.  
Adapted from Wright, J et.al. (1998) 
 
Examples: 
1. Psychosocial needs  
2. Well rehabilitation  
3. Shelters 
4. Microfinance 
5. Health promotion 
campaign 
6. Privacy walls around wells 
7. Sewing machines 
1 
3 
2 4 
6
5 7 
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The issue of how psychosocial needs of survivors are dealt with is especially 
illustrative of the difficulties encountered when trying to match aid to needs. There is 
ongoing debate on how best to respond to the psychosocial needs of disaster 
survivors.27  There are many practical considerations such as the lack of skilled staff, 
resources, or simply of political will. However, often the biggest challenge is trying to 
change “entrenched perspectives and practices of international agencies and 
donors”.28  
 
The limitations of beneficiary feedback 
This study shows that rapid participatory approaches can be used to obtain beneficiary 
feedback in post-disaster settings to guide programme planning. However, some 
limitations were also encountered. Beneficiaries tended to be highly critical of the 
INGOs despite their best efforts in difficult circumstances. One possibility is that 
positive impacts of aid were overlooked by dissatisfied beneficiaries whose 
expectations were not met. This suggests a potential flaw of participative approaches; 
just as traditional evaluations may be biased towards donor or INGO priorities, 
similarly, beneficiary feedback can give prejudiced views that are partial to the 
interests of the interviewee.  
 
The evaluation of programmes using beneficiary feedback is further complicated by 
the ‘contaminating’ effects of other actors present locally. Within Ampara, aid was 
provided by several NGOs, UN agencies as well as the government. This made it 
difficult to separate out the ‘effects’ of aid and to attribute them to individual 
agencies. Similarly, the community was often unable to distinguish who had provided 
what aid. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Currently, many relief programmes overlook the ramifications of their actions that 
may extend beyond what is measured in project log-frames. The humanitarian aid 
sector is a maturing field that needs to foster an evaluative culture as part of 
organizational learning. Impact assessments are essential but not straightforward due 
to the contextual-specificity of programmes and limited comparability of different 
programmes. Furthermore, disentangling the impacts of one programme from other 
programmes co-existing in a locality is difficult. Nonetheless, these assessments can 
help inform planning, decision-making and programme implementation, and provide a 
more integrative evaluation of a programme than process or output indicators.29 
 
Beneficiaries are not passive receptacles of aid, but consist of multiple actors with 
differing interests and power relations. In the face of adversity, the community’s 
resilience manifests through local coping mechanisms based on its network of group-
based and family ties.30 This resilience can be jeopardized by the cumulative effects 
of the social upheaval caused by the disaster, chronic conflict, unemployment, 
material deprivation and adverse impacts of relief aid that alters the dynamics of 
social interaction between the various actors.31 An understanding of the context in 
which aid is delivered is essential. Failure to do so risks exacerbating pre-existing 
tensions or creating new ones. 
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Beneficiary accountability requires meaningful community engagement, good 
handling of community relations, and sensitive matching of aid to perceived needs.  
Many relief programmes seek to restore the status quo ante but this may neither be 
appropriate or desired. 24 Matching the relief provided to the needs of a community is 
a challenge that is best facilitated through consultation with the stakeholders. 
Obtaining beneficiary feedback is therefore essential in disaster planning and 
response. However, these approaches may not be appropriate in all situations, and a 
judgement has to be made as to the timing and extent that participative approaches are 
applied. INGOs need to be wary of relying solely on beneficiary feedback which in 
itself may be biased.  
 
Humanitarian aid in Ampara has had a mix of positive and unintended adverse effects. 
Unmet needs still remain, but it is unrealistic to expect that any agency can fulfil all 
the needs.32 An awareness of the potential impacts of humanitarian aid is the first step 
in the mitigation of further ill-effects. ■ 
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